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ABSTRACT
We estimate hedonic price indexes for clinical trial research, an important component of biomedical
R&D, using a large sample of agreements between trial sponsors and clinical investigators obtained
from Medidata Solutions Worldwide Inc.  Nominal prices measured as total grant cost per patient
rose by a factor of 4.5 between 1989 and 2011, while the NIH Biomedical R&D Price Index (BRDPI)
focused on input costs rose only 2.2-fold.  Most of the disparity appears to be attributable to changes
in the nature and organization of clinical trials: during this period the average number of patients per
site fell substantially while “site work effort” more than doubled.  After controlling for these changes
in the characteristics of investigator agreements using a variety of methods based on hedonic regressions,
we find that the estimated rate of inflation in clinical trials costs tracks the BDRPI very closely.  Results
from this study suggest that it should be feasible for statistical agencies to develop a producer price
index for this type of R&D activity, contributing to broader efforts to develop a deflator for contracted
R&D services.
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I. Introduction 
R&D expenditures are widely acknowledged to a play a key role in economic growth and 
competitiveness, and statistics on R&D are closely watched as indicators of technological change 
and national economic performance.
1
  Yet R&D has historically been treated in the national 
accounts as a business expense, rather than as an investment in knowledge capital, which has 
important implications for estimates of GDP and GDP growth.  As a first step in treating R&D as 
an investment component of GDP, the Bureau of Economic Analysis has created an R&D 
satellite account, which reports that R&D contributed 20 basis points to the re-estimated 2.9% 
average rate of real GDP growth from 1957 to 2007.
2
  But such calculations can be quite 
sensitive to the use of deflators, and the nature of R&D activities present substantial price 
measurement challenges to statistical agencies.  Although BLS has steadily expanded the scope 
of its collection of price statistics for the service sector, it does not currently publish a PPI for 
business R&D services, a major component of total R&D activity in the US.
3
  In experimenting 
with the satellite R&D accounts, the BEA has utilized various proxy deflators to construct 
measures of real business R&D output, including cost-based aggregate indexes for inputs to 
R&D (that implicitly assume no productivity growth in R&D activities), weighted combinations 
of gross output prices of industries investing in R&D, and a variety of other next best alternatives 
in lieu of actual R&D output prices.
4
  Were a broad-based PPI for contracted business R&D 
available, this could be used to develop estimates of real private sector R&D output by deflating 
                                                     
1
 Although the United States has long led the world in combined government and industry spending on research and 
development (R&D), in recent years Asian economies have increased their R&D to GDP intensity, resulting in R&D 
levels that have gained considerable ground on that of the U.S.  One estimate has 2012 US R&D expenditures of 
$418.6 billion and an R&D/GDP ratio of 2.68%, while comparable numbers for China are $197.3 billion and 1.60%, 
and for Japan $159.9 billion and 3.48%  Other countries with 2012 R&D/GDP ratios of greater than 3% include 
Finland at 3.80%, Sweden 3.62%, South Korea 3.45% and Denmark 3.08%.  Source: Battelle Institute, R&D 
Magazine, 2012 Global R&D Funding Forecast “2012 Global R&D Funding Forecast”, p. 5,  December 2011.  
Available online at http://www.battelle.org/docs/default-document-library/2012_global_forecast.pdf, last 
accessed 11 January 2013.  
2
 Lee, J and Schmidt, AG. “Research and Development Satellite Account Update: Estimates for 1959–2007” Survey 
of Current Business, 90(12):16-27. December 2010  
3
 Industry performs about 71% of R&D in the US.  Battelle Institute, R&D Magazine, 2012 Global R&D Funding 
Forecast, p. 6.   
4
 David Friedman [2010], “Developing a PPI for Scientific Research and Development NAICS 5417/ISIC 7310”, 
presentation at the 25
th
 Meeting of the Voorburg Group, Vienna, Austria, 23 September 2010.  Available online at 
http://stds.statcan.ca/english/voorburg/Documents/2010%20Vienna/Papers/2010%20-%2081.pdf, last accessed 13 
January 2013, slide 6; also see Adam Copeland and Dennis Fixler, “Measuring the Price of Research and 
Development Output”, paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Summer Institute 
Productivity Program, J:uly 2008; and Adam Copeland, Gabriel W. Medeiros and Carol A. Robbins, “Estimating 
Prices for R&D Investment in the 2007 R&D Satellite Accounte Background Paper, November 2007, both available 
at www.bea.gov.   
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a portion of the Census Bureau’s NAICS 5417 nominal expenditure estimates for “Scientific 
Research and Development Services”.   As noted by BLS Assistant Commissioner David 
Friedman, however, what is desired is an ideal PPI “that directly measures actual market 
transactions for R&D output”.5  
This paper contributes to this broader effort by studying measurement of such R&D 
transactions prices for the specific area of biomedical clinical research.  Biomedical research is 
the single biggest component of the R&D sector’s estimated contribution to growth: in the 
BEA’s initial estimates in the satellite account, biotechnology related industries contributed 
44%,of the total business R&D contribution to real GDP growth between 1998 and 2007, with 
information-communications-technology producing industries contributing 36%, transportation 
equipment industries 11% and all other industries 9%.
6
  Within biomedical research, clinical 
trials account for a large fraction of commercial R&D expenditure in this sector: of the $46.4 
billion spent by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) member 
companies in 2010 on R&D, $32.5 billion (70%) was spent on clinical trials involving human 
subjects, with a much smaller proportion devoted to pre-clinical and basic research.
7
  In recent 
years, clinical research has accounted for about 1/3 of the total NIH budget ($10.7 billion out of 
$30 billion in FY2010) of which a substantial fraction ($3.2 billion in FY2010) is expenditure on 
clinical trials.
8
    
Clinical research is also an activity which has seen significant organizational, 
technological and economic changes, with potentially important implications for productivity.  
Over the past three decades, the design and management of clinical trials has become 
increasingly sophisticated, and at the same time the types of organizations conducting clinical 
trials have changed.  Much of the effort in running clinical trials is increasingly contracted out to 
specialist entities called contract research organizations (CROs) rather than being incurred “in 
house” or by biopharmaceutical companies in collaborations with external academic medical 
center investigators.  Moreover, within the US, sponsors are moving trials away from academic 
                                                     
5
 Friedman [2010], slide 6. 
6
 Friedman [2010], Slide 5., 
7
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2011, Washington DC, 
PhRMA, April 2011, , Appendix Table 5, p. 45.  Expenditure on Phase 1 trials was $3.753 billion, Phase 2 $7.124 
billion, Phase 3 $16.300 billion, and Phase 4 5.303 billion. 
8
 See http://report.nih.gov/rcdc/categories/default.aspx, visited 11/30/2011. 
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medical centers toward physician practices, many of them for-profit.
9
  For example, while the 
number of clinical research contracts carried out annually by academic investigators remained 
relatively constant at about 3,000 between 1991 and 1999, over the same time period the number 
of trial research contracts with non-academic investigators increased from about 1,700 to 5,000.  
 Importantly, multi-site clinical trials have also become increasingly global in nature, 
recruiting patients in many countries simultaneously. For a large Phase III trial evaluating 
cardiovascular or central nervous system drugs, more than 10,000 patients will typically be 
recruited at 100-200 sites in ten or more countries worldwide.
10
  The size of dossiers filed by 
biopharmaceutical firms in support of New Drug Applications (NDAs) at the US Food and Drug 
Administration has increased over time, reflecting increased complexity and detailed site-
specific information: the mean number of pages per NDA increased from 38,000 in 1977-80 to 
56,000 in 185-88 and 91,000 in 1989-92.
11
  
To date, very little information has been available on trends in the pricing of the R&D 
services that are the inputs to clinical trials.  In 1985 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics began 
publishing producer price indexes (PPIs) for various service sector industries, an effort which has 
expanded to include including PPIs for aspects of health care delivery such as hospitals and 
physician services
12
.  However these indexes do not cover contracted business R&D.   To date, 
the only published source of information on trends in pricing in the biomedical R&D sector is the 
Biomedical R&D Price Index (BRDPI) constructed by the BEA under contract with the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH).   The BRDPI is  based on a chained Laspeyres methodology using 
micro budget data from individual NIH investigator grants.  This index measures changes in the 
weighted-average of the prices of all the inputs (e.g., personnel services, various supplies, and 
equipment) that are purchased or leased with the NIH budget to support research.  Input weights 
                                                     
9See  Pierre Azoulay, “Capturing Knowledge Within and Across Firm Boundaries: Evidence from Clinical 
Development”, American Economic Review 94(5):1591-1612, December 2004.  Available at 
http://pazoulay.scripts.mit.edu/pubs/knowledge.pdf; Pierre Azoulay and Ariel Fishman, “Doctors, $$ and Drug 
Development: The Rise for For-Profit Experimental Medicine”, paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research Location of Biopharmaceutical Activity Conference, Savannah, GA, March 7-8, 2008.  Available from 
pazoulay@mit.edu 
10
 See, for example, Fabio Thiers, Anthony J. Sinskey and  Ernst R. Berndt, “Trends in the Globalization of Clinical 
Trials”, Nature Reviews: Drug Discovery 7(1):13-14, 2008.  doi:10-1038/nrd2441. 
11
 Pierre Azoulay, “The Changing Economics of Clinical Development”, presentation to the Earth Institute, 
Columbia University, May 20, 2004, slide 7.  Available from pazoulay@mit.edu. 
12
 Roslyn Swick, Deanna Bathgate and Michael Horrigan, “Services Producer Price Indices: Past, Present, and 
Future”, paper presented at the Federal Economic Statistics Advisory Committee on June 9, 2006.    
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reflect the changing actual shares of total NIH expenditures on each of the types of inputs 
purchased.
 13
  According to the NIH,  
“Theoretically, the annual change in the BRDPI indicates how much NIH 
expenditures would need to increase, without regard to efficiency gains or 
changes in government priorities, to compensate for the average increase in prices 
due to inflation and to maintain NIH-funded research activity at the previous 
year’s level.”14   
 
The BRDPI is published annually on a federal government fiscal year (October 1 – September 
30) basis and reaches back to 1950. 
In addition to contributing to the broader effort to construct measures of real R&D 
output, the development of a quality-constant PPI for clinical R&D would provide insights on 
important policy issues specific to this sector. For example, while total R&D spending by 
PhRMA member companies has almost doubled over the last decade
15
 (as has the overall NIH 
budget
16
), the number of new drugs and biologics approved by the FDA each year in the last 
decade has not yet returned to its mid-1990s peak levels.  One prominent study reports that the 
capitalized cost of bringing a new drug to market, adjusted for general inflation in year 2000 
dollars, more than doubled from $318 to $802 million between 1991 and 2003.
17
   
This raises some very basic—and as yet unanswered—questions.  Increases in the cost 
per approved drug are often equated with “the price of innovation”, but in fact little is known 
about how much of the increase in expenditure reflects changes in the prices of inputs to 
biomedical research and how much reflects changes in the quantity and complexity of research 
being performed.  Have the prices of inputs to clinical research increased more rapidly than 
overall inflation, or are these inputs being used more intensively, or are both occurring?  
Moreover, to what extent has the “quality” of inputs changed?  The growing complexity of 
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 For details on the construction of the BRDPI, see James Schuttinga, “The Biomedical Research and Development 
Price Index”, powerpoint presentation for MIT economists, March 25, 2008; National Institutes of Health, Office of 
Budget, “Biomedical Research and Development Price Index (BRDPI): Fiscal Year 2010 Update and Projections for 
FY 20110FY2016, Press Release, January 24, 2011.   Available online at 
http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/pdfs/FY12/BRDPI_Proj_Jan_2011_Final.pdf..   
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 National Institutes of Health [2011], p. 1.   
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 Total R&D spending by PhRMA member companies was $26.0 billion in 2000, and $49.4 billion in 2010, an 
increase of 90%.  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America [2011], Appendix Table 1, p. 42. 
16
 The total NIH budget obligations in fiscal year 2000 was $l7.8 billion, and $31.0 billion in fiscal year 2010, an 
increase of 74%.  National Institutes of Health, Mechanism Detail, Actual Obligations, available at 
http://officeofbudget.od.nih.   
17
 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen and Henry G. Grabowski, “The Price of  Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs”, Journal of Health Economics 22(2):151-85, March 2003.  
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clinical trials and the underlying science suggests that more time, more highly trained personnel, 
and more sophisticated equipment may be required to conduct a typical study.
18
   
Very little data is currently available to inform discussion of such issues.  While data are 
captured for some inputs to clinical research, such as salaries of post-doctoral fellows, relatively 
little is known about other important inputs to clinical research such as site administration costs, 
computational time, materials and investigator salaries.  Critically, even where good data are 
available on input prices, it is important to take into account how inputs are combined by 
focusing on an appropriate unit of analysis.
19
   
More generally, in the language of the economics of price measurement, what is needed 
is measures of  “constant-quality” changes in prices and quantities, i.e., holding the 
characteristics of the input and output activities constant when looking at changes in 
expenditures over time or cross-sectionally.  Failure to do so can result in quite misleading 
interpretations and policy recommendations.  Analyses of expenditures on personal computers, 
for example, recognize that there have been huge increases in the performance or capacity of the 
products sold, but very small changes in their nominal prices; “constant quality” prices have thus 
fallen substantially over time—various estimates suggest sustained real price declines of more 
than 25% per year over several decades.
20
   Various governmental statistical agencies now 
routinely take this phenomenon into account for many types of information technology and other 
electronic goods in developing estimates of GDP, with quite marked impacts on measures of 
economic growth and productivity.
21
  
While it is important, therefore, to quantify the “price” versus “quantity” component 
changes in R&D, adjusting both for quality, characterizing scientific research presents some very 
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 Kenneth A. Getz, Julia Wenger, Rafael Campo, Eward S. Seguine and Kenneth L. Kaitlin, “Assessing the Impact 
of Protocol Design Changes on Clinical Trial Performance”, American Journal of Therapeutics 15(5):450-57, 2008. 
19
 See, for example, the highly influential studies by Cutler and coauthors on the costs of treating heart attacks which 
has had a major impact on analyses of health expenditures by focusing attention on changes in the cost of an 
“episode of care” due to input substitution, rather than on changes in the per unit-price of inputs to care.  See, for 
example, David Cutler [1998], “Are Medical Prices Falling?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 991-
1024; David Cutler and Mark McClellan [1998], “What Is Technological Change?”, in David Wise, ed., Inquiries in 
the Economics of Aging, Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the NBER; and David Cutler and Mark 
McClellan [2001], “Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth It?”, Health Affairs 20(1):11-29. 
20
 See, for example, Ernst R. Berndt and Neal J. Rappaport, ”Price and Quality of Desktop and Mobile Personal 
Computers: A Quarter Century Historical Overview”, American Economic Review 91(2):268-73, May 2001,  and the 
references cited therein. 
21
 For more detailed discussion, see ch. 4 in Charles L. Schultze and Christopher Mackie, eds., At What Price?  
Conceptualizing and Measuring Cost-of-Living and Price Indexes, Washington DC: National Academy Press for the 
National “Academy of Sciences, 2002. 
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substantial measurement problems.  Research activities are typically highly heterogeneous and 
idiosyncratic in nature, drawing on quite different inputs and resources to produce “output” 
which is very difficult to measure consistently.  However in one respect, clinical trials may be 
unusually tractable.  Clinical development is a highly structured activity, in which individual 
“experiments” are relatively well-defined and activity is closely tracked.  Industry trends are also 
creating an unusual opportunity to investigate these questions.  While biopharmaceutical 
companies and non-profit entities continue to be the lead sponsors of clinical trials, much of the 
effort in conducting them is increasingly outsourced to contract research organizations (“CROs”) 
rather than being incurred in-house.  At least within the US, the investigators who recruit, treat, 
and observe subjects are drawn less from academic medical centers and increasingly more from 
independent physician practices.
22
  This has meant that data on contractual terms among all these 
parties are now ever more important and increasingly visible.   
We report here results from a study directed at assessing the feasibility of constructing a 
PPI for clinical trial research, based on actual transactions data involving CRO contracts.  
Specifically, we analyse a sample of over 215,000 contracts regarding payments made by trial 
sponsors (directly or through CRO intermediaries) to clinical investigators and study sites from 
the PICAS® database maintained by Medidata Worldwide Solutions, Inc.  This sample covers 
over 24,000 distinct Phase I through Phase IV clinical study protocols conducted between 1989 
and 2011 in 52 different countries.  Using information on the protocol characteristics, we 
estimate parameters in multiple regression equations and compute hedonic price indexes that 
allow us to estimate the rate of inflation in this particular aspect of clinical research, controlling 
for changes in the characteristics of clinical trials over the sample period.  Because hedonic price 
indexes based on regression equations estimated using data pooled over time would entail 
revising the historical price index time series each time another time period of data was added to 
the sample, we also investigate use of chained indexes based on sequential “adjacent year” 
regressions, and Paasche, Laspeyres, and Fisher Ideal indexes based on single-year regression 
equations and from utilizing the “pure hedonics” approach in which year-on-year changes in the 
estimated price of characteristics are weighted by once-lagged (Laspeyres) or current period 
(Paasche) characteristics quantities.
23
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 Azoulay [2004], and Azoulay and Fishman [2008]. 
23
 We thank Marshall Reinsdorf, the discussant of a previous version of this paper, for this suggestion.  The method 
we utilize was presented by Ariel Pakes and by Ernst Berndt, Zvi Griliches and Neal J. Rappaport.  See Ariel Pakes, 
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We find that while our measure of unit costs of this aspect of conducting clinical trials 
rose rapidly over the two decades covered by this sample at about 8% per year (roughly twice the 
rate of inflation in the NIH’s Biomedical R&D Price Index), these changes in nominal costs 
appear to be driven by a variety of factors other than input costs.  At least in this sample there 
has been a substantial increase in the level of effort required by investigators, and significant 
changes in both the composition of the sample across therapeutic classes and stages of clinical 
development, as well as in the organization of trials with a trend towards smaller numbers of 
patients per site and considerable variation over time in the geographic distribution of ex-US 
sites.  After controlling for these factors using a variety of hedonic regression methods, we find 
much lower growth rates in costs, with adjusted rates of inflation between 1/3 and 2/3 lower than 
those seen in the unadjusted data.  Interestingly, we find that growth of the price index based on 
our preferred hedonic price regression specification using US data between 1989 and 2011 is 
virtually identical to that of the BRDPI.   
II. Data 
With the co-operation of Medidata Worldwide Solutions, Inc. (“Medidata”), we 
assembled a dataset of 216,076 observations on “investigator grants,” which are payments made 
by a trial sponsor to the individual investigators or “sites” that enroll subjects.24  These payments 
cover the investigators’ costs of recruiting subjects, administering the treatments, measuring 
clinical endpoints, etc., plus overhead allowances reflecting payments for the use of the site’s 
facilities.  We focus on the total grant cost per patient (“TGPP”) as the economically meaningful 
unit of analysis for understanding price trends.  Total grant cost per patient is the total amount 
paid by the sponsor under its contract with the site, divided by the number of patients planned to 
be enrolled at that site.  For about 12% of the records contained in the PICAS® database, the 
contract specifies only a per-patient amount, not the number of patients.  These contracts are 
excluded from the results reported below (although we apply certain robustness checks), since 
                                                                                                                                                                           
“A Reconsideration of Hedonic Price Indexes with an Application to PCs”, American Economic Review 93(5):1578-
1614, December 2003, and by Ernst R. Berndt, Zvi Griliches and Neal J. Rappaport, “Econometric Estimates of 
Price Indexes for Personal Computers in the 1990s”, Journal of Econometrics 68(1):243-268, July 1995, and the 
references cited therein. 
24
 The dataset was originally compiled by Fast Track Systems; Medidata acquired Fast Track in 2007.  For further 
details see Fast Track Systems, Grants Manager Data Dictionary, Conshohocken, PA: Fast Track Systems, Inc. 
Excel spreadsheet file, 2006 and Medidata Solutions Worldwide, “Medidata Solutions Partners with Fast Track 
Systems to Accelerate Enterprise-Wide Deployment of Electronic Clinical Trials”, press release, February 7,  2007-, 
accessed 7 December 2008. 
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we are unable to control for the scale of the site’s effort.  For ex-US sites where the contract is in 
a foreign currency, we convert to US dollars using the spot exchange rate.  Typically these 
payments make up about half of the total cost of a trial, the remainder being headquarters’ 
“overhead” in the form of trial design, data management and analysis, site selection and 
monitoring, etc., by the sponsors.  
Table I shows a summary of the number of records in the dataset by year each 
investigator contract was signed, along with summary statistics for the TGPP.  The dataset used 
here covers the almost quarter century period 1989 to 2011.  The number of records per year 
varies over time, with the period 1992-2002 accounting for almost 75% of the total number of 
records.  The number of records per year in our sample reached a peak in 2000 and declines 
steadily thereafter, reflecting two factors.  First, the PICAS® database was originally compiled 
from an archive of paper records, and has since transitioned to electronic source documents.  
This transition led to a temporary decline in the number of contributions from the participating 
organizations in 2004-2005.  Second, the fraction of contracts that do not specify the number of 
patients expected to be enrolled at the site (and are excluded from our sample) has increased over 
the past decade.  This trend likely reflects tighter “real time” tracking and control of patient 
enrollment by trial sponsors and challenges in sites being equally able to enroll planned number 
of patients at their sites.  
As can be seen from the table, the mean TGPP rises quite rapidly in nominal terms, just 
over four-fold over the period 1989 to 2011, from $3773 to $16567, with an average annual 
growth rate (AAGR) of 7.5%;
25
 the median value of each year increases slightly more rapidly, 
from $2779 to $13222, an AAGR of 8.2%.
26
  By comparison, between fiscal years 1989 and 
2011 the NIH’s BRDPI increased much more slowly, barely doubling at an AAGR only half as 
large at 3.7%.
27
  The distribution of TGPP is quite skewed, with the median somewhat below the 
mean value; a visual plot suggests that TGPP can be reasonably approximated with the 
lognormal distribution.  Notably, the within-year coefficient of variation is relatively large but 
stable at around 0.80 at both the beginning and end of the sample period.  While we attempt to 
account for this variation in TGPP with measured site and protocol characteristics, some part is 
                                                     
25
 These AAGRs are literally the arithmetic means of year-over-year growth rates; the compounded average annual 
growth rate (CAGR) is slightly less, at 7.0%; see note 40 below. 
26
 In the somewhat larger sample (245,803 records) that includes contracts where the number of patients is not 
specified, figures are very similar: mean TGPP rises from $3,752 to $15,567 at an AAGR of 7.1%. 
27
 National Institutes of Health [2011], Supplemental Table A, p. 6. 
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likely attributable to factors such as the conversion of foreign transactions to US $ using the spot 
exchange rate at the time of the transaction.   
Table II and Figures 1 and 2 show two important aspects of trials that impact the costs 
incurred by an investigator: site work effort and number of patients.  Site work effort (SWE) is a 
patent-pending measure of clinical trial complexity and burden developed by Medidata.  SWE 
was constructed as follows.  Based on examination of detailed protocols, inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, the number and use intensity of various procedures such as laboratory tests, blood work, 
questionnaires and subjective assessments, office consultations and examinations, and use of 
diagnostic technologies such as x-rays, imaging or heart activity assessments, relative value units 
(RVUs)
28
, or where unavailable or inapplicable, comparable Work Effort Unit (WEUs) created 
by Medidata in conjunction with researchers at the Tufts Center for Study of Drug Development, 
were assigned to each procedure in a trial protocol.  A complexity measure was computed simply 
as the number of distinct procedures in the trial protocol.  An aggregate investigative SWE 
measure was then computed as the cumulated product of the number and intensity in use of these 
procedures, in RVU/WEU units, conducted over the course of the entire protocol for each of the 
trials.
29
 It is important to note that SWE is therefore a protocol-level measure of the work effort 
required from each site, and that actual resources used by each site in implementing the protocol 
may differ to some degree.  Table II panel (a) and Figure 1 report descriptive statistics for SWE 
for the 24,236 distinct protocols in our sample. As can be seen there , mean and median values of 
SWE have increased very significantly over time, with the mean value per protocol rising almost 
three-fold between 1989 and 2011, at AAGRs of 5.2% (mean) and 6.1% (median).
30
   
By contrast, as seen in panel (b) of Table II and in Figure 2, the mean number of patients 
per site has fallen substantially over the same period from 25.48 to 11.83, a factor of about two, 
whereas the median has fallen more dramatically, from 20 to eight.  The relative volatility 
(coefficient of variation) of number patients per site has increased steadily, from about 1.3 in 
1989 to about 1.7 in 1999-2000 and to 2.0 in 2010, while that for SWE has been relatively stable 
at about 0.7.   
                                                     
28
 RVUs are measures constructed by Medicare to estimate the relative level of physician time, skill, training, and 
expertise and required equipment, supplies, rent and office staffing costs for conducting procedures, which Medicare 
relies upon to establish payment levels for physicians’ services. 
29
 For further details, see Getz, Wenger, Campo et al. [2008]. 
30
 Very similar figures are obtained for the slightly larger set of protocols where the investigator contracts do not 
specify the number of patients at a site, or from a reweighting of the protocol-level statistics by the number of 
contracts per protocol. 
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These changes in nominal TGPP, SWE, and number of patients per site suggest that 
important changes are occurring in the cost and nature of outsourced clinical research.  Of 
course, some of these trends may reflect a changing composition of the sample in the mix of 
therapeutic areas and phases of research, and in the location of sites in the US versus other 
countries.  Tables III through V provide descriptive statistics on the composition of the sample 
by various trial characteristics.  Table III breaks out the fraction of observations annually by the 
development phase of the protocol.  Clinical trials are conventionally categorized by stage of 
development.  Phase I trials typically enroll a small number of healthy volunteers, and are 
focused on safety, tolerability, dose-ranging, pharmacokinetics, etc.  Phase II trials enroll larger 
numbers of patients (not healthy volunteers) and investigate the potential for efficacy by 
assessing biological activity or effect of the treatment at alternative putatively safe doses.  Phase 
III trials focus on efficacy of the treatment in therapeutic use, enrolling large numbers of 
patients.  Phase IIIa refers to trials conducted prior to making a submission for regulatory 
approval, while Phase IIIb trials are those initiated after the submission for approval but prior to 
commercial launch.  Phase IV trials are conducted after a drug has been approved, often as part 
of continued investigation of safety. While the fraction of the sample made up by sites involved 
in Phase I, Phase IIIb, and Phase IV studies was approximately stable, there has been a 
significant swing in the shares of Phase II and Phase IIIa.  In 1989, Phase II trials made up less 
than 10% of the sample, and Phase IIIa almost 75%.  By the end of the sample period in 2011, 
Phase II studies comprised almost 30% of trials and Phase IIIa studies dropped to under 60%.  If 
early stage trials are more costly to conduct on a per patient basis, then this shift among trial 
phases may account for some of the increase in mean TGPP over time.   
Table IV presents the allocation of investigator grants over 15 different therapeutic areas.  
Reflecting the burden of disease, trials involving the six “largest” therapeutic areas (central 
nervous system, cardiovascular, respiratory system, endocrine, oncology and anti-infectives) 
make up 70% of the sample on average.  Shares of central nervous system and oncology trials 
grew somewhat over time until 2005-6, while cardiovascular shrank, suggesting that to the extent 
central nervous system and oncology trials are relatively more costly to conduct, these 
compositional changes may have some effect on increases in average TGPP up to 2005-2006. 
Table V presents the geographic breakdown of the sites in this sample.  Over the entire 
sample time period, 56% of sites were in the US, with most of the remainder in other OECD 
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countries, and only 5.4% in the rest of the world (ROW).  Interestingly, although the US share is 
about 80% in both the earliest and latest years, there is substantial year-to-year and trend 
variability.  However, as shown in Table I we observe considerably smaller numbers of 
observations in 1989-1991 and 2003-2011 relative to the 1992-2002 time period; any trend 
analysis is therefore tentative. 
III. Hedonic Price Index Methodology 
The hedonic pricing approach has a long tradition in economic measurement, going back 
almost a century.
31
  In essence, the hedonic approach treats the item being priced as a bundle of 
observed characteristics, and using multivariate regression methods, estimates “shadow prices” 
of each of the observed characteristics and the aggregate price index as a composite of the 
observed characteristics each multiplied by its shadow price.  In practice, given observations in 
each period t on the prices Pit of a set of items i with characteristics Xit, this means estimating a 
regression model on pooled data of the form log(Pit) = Xitβ+Ztγ+εit where Zt is a set of dummy 
variables for each period and εit is a random error term.  This semi-log functional form is widely 
used in hedonic price analysis.
32
  Predicted values from this regression provide the basis for 
computing changes in a “quality-adjusted” composite price index Pt: with a set of time dummies 
in the regression, the change in the composite index relative to the base period is given by the 
exponentiated values of their estimated coefficients ( ).  Although E[exp(P)] ≠ exp(E[P]) and εit  
may not be homoscedastic, suggesting a “smearing” adjustment of the type discussed in the 
medical costs literature,
33
 with time dummies in the regression these adjustment factors will 
typically be small.
 34
  (In the case where residuals are homoscedastic within time periods but 
heteroscedastic across time, adjustments such as the nonparametric method proposed by Duan 
                                                     
31
 For an historical overview of hedonic price analysis, see ch. 4 in Ernst R. Berndt, The Practice of Econometrics: 
Classic and Contemporary, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1991 also see Ernst R. Berndt, 
Zvi Griliches and Neal J. Rappapor [1995]; and Berndt and Rappaport [2001], “Price and Quality of Desktop and 
Mobile Personal Computers: A Quarter Century Historical Overview”, American Economic Review 91(2):268-273, 
May.. 
32
 See Berndt [1991], ch. 4, and Jack E. Triplett, Handbook on Hedonic Indexes and Quality Adjustment in Price 
Indexes, Paris, Organization for Economic Community Development, 2006 for further discussion. 
33
 Applications are primarily in modeling health care costs and outcomes.  See, for example, Nathan Duan 
“Smearing Estimate: A Nonparametric Retransformation Method”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 
78:605-10, 983;, Willard G. Manning and John Mullahy, “Estimating log mod els: To Transform or Not to 
Transform?”, Journal of Health Economics 20:461-94, 2001; Willard G. Manning, “The Logged Dependent 
Variable, Heteroskedasticity, and the Retransformation Problem”, Journal of Health Economics 17:283-95,  1998;  
and John Mullahy, “Much Ado About Two:  Reconsidering Retransformation and the Two-Part Model in Health 
Econometrics, Journal of Health Economics 17:247-81,  1998.   
34
 See Triplett [2006] p.34, footnote 41. 
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will give estimates that are numerically identical to non-adjusted ones.
35
  We found very similar 
adjusted and unadjusted estimated index values, and here we report only estimates with no 
further adjustment for cross-year heteroscedasticity.) 
In this application, the “priced item” is the investigator total grant cost per patient. TGPP, 
and our hedonic regression takes the form log(TGPPit) = Xitβ+Ztγ+εit, with X containing site and 
trial characteristics including planned number of patients at the investigator’s site, location and 
number of sites and countries participating in the trial, phase of development, therapeutic area, 
and the site work effort (SWE) measure of trial burden and complexity.
36
  Zt are annual indicator 
variables.  Estimated standard errors are Huber-White robust, clustered by trial protocol; 
computations were carried out in STATA.   
IV. Estimation and Price Index Results 
We now report results based on various regressions, and calculate corresponding average 
annual growth rates (AAGRs) of implied hedonic price indexes.  Although all regressions have 
as regressors indicator variables for therapeutic class and year, we pool over and then run 
separate regressions by trial phase; in terms of time periods, we pool over the entire 1989-2011 
time period, and then run separate regressions for the 1989-1999 and 2000-2011 subperiods.
37
  In 
all cases the dependent variable is the logarithm of total grant cost per patient (ln TGPP).
38
    
Of particular interest to us are the coefficient estimates on two clinical trial characteristics 
variables—the logarithm of number patients at the site (LPATIENTS) and site work effort 
(SWE).
39
  Note that we have no expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient on the 
LPATIENTS variable; a negative estimate implies economies of scale at the site level, whereas a 
positive estimate corresponds to diseconomies of scale.  Because SWE measures the cumulative 
burden of various clinical trial protocol procedures, we expect it to have a positive coefficient.  
                                                     
35
 See Duan reference in footnote 33 above. 
36
 Using log(SWE) does not change the sign or significance of the estimated SWE-related coefficient, or result in 
material differences in the other estimates. 
37
 In all models, tests of the joint null hypothesis that coefficient estimates on SWE, LPATIENTS and the various 
indicator variables were stable over the two time intervals were decisively rejected. 
38
 When pooled over time, the number of observations in the top panel regressions is 207,950  (All), 118,477  (US 
Only), and 89,473  (Rest of World); for the 1989-1999 (2000-2009) regressions, the corresponding numbers of 
observations are 125,736 (82,217), 66,246 (52,231) and 59,490 (29,983).  Of course the number of observations in 
the various by phase regressions is smaller, with the smallest number being 2,738 for the 2000-2011 Phase I 
regressions. 
39
 The log transform is used for patients because of the high degree of skewness and wide range of this variable.  
SWE falls in a much tighter range.  No substantial differences in the results were obtained using log(SWE). 
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Parameter estimates on these two variables, under alternative models and time periods, are 
presented in Table VI.  With two exceptions (both involving LPATIENTS in Phase II trials), all 
of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, based on robust standard 
errors.   
A number of results are striking.  As shown in the top panel of Table VI, when pooled 
over all phases (but including trial phase as indicator variables), globally and for ex-US (Rest of 
World), in all three time period regressions the estimated coefficient on LPATIENTS is positive 
and highly significant; however, for the US Only model the coefficient estimate is negative and 
significant.  The implied estimated elasticities of TGPP with respect to patients range from  
-0.122 to 0.183.   
The pattern of estimates on LPATIENTS becomes a bit more nuanced when separate 
regressions are run by trial phase.  Specifically, a general pattern that prevails is that negative 
estimates occur for the Phase I and Phase II regressions for the All and Rest of World 
regressions, but these estimates become positive and ever larger as one moves to the increasingly 
larger patient size trials.  In Phase IIIA, Phase IIIB and Phase IV trials, almost all the estimates 
are positive and significant even at p-values <0.01.  Also notable is the substantial range in 
estimates of the elasticity of TGPP with respect to patients, from -0.176 to 0.320 in the pooled 
1989-2011 regressions, even larger from -0.219 to 0.305 in the 1989-1999 regressions, and in the 
2000-2011 regressions, ranging from -0.190 to 0.272.  The pooled phases and by phase 
regressions based on US only data reveal considerably greater stability, both across the various 
time period regressions and across trial phases. 
A second set of striking findings in Table VI is that every one of the estimates on the 
SWE variable is positive and statistically significant at p-values < 0.01, with the general (but not 
quite universal) pattern being that the positive estimates increase monotonically as one moves 
from the small Phase I to the larger Phase IIIB and Phase IV trials.  The steepness of the positive 
slope with larger trial phase is flatter for the US Only regressions, however, than for the All and 
Rest of World regressions, with the Phase IV All and Rest of World estimates being particularly 
large; the vast majority of estimates on the SWE variable are in the range of 0.01 to 0.03. Using a 
mean value of SWE of about 25 (see Table II), a one-unit increase in SWE changes it by about 
4% (1/25), leading to about on average a 2% increase in TGPP, suggesting an elasticity of TGPP 
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with respect to SWE of about 0.50 (= 0.02/0.04) when evaluated at the sample means.  That is a 
very substantial effect. 
A third implication of findings in Table VI is that they help explain factors affecting 
increases in trial costs, particularly for the US.   The regression results suggests that increases in 
TGPP over time have been driven by increases in SWE and decreases in the number of patients 
at each site (particularly in the US where for each phase coefficient estimates on LPATIENTS 
are mostly negative.) Whether the changing composition among trial phases (towards Phase II 
and away from Phase IIIA—see Table III) can “explain” the increase in TGPP merits further 
examination.   
We now move on to consider implications of these various regression models for the 
growth rate of our price indexes.  As discussed above, annual values of an hedonic price index 
can be constructed from estimated coefficients on indicator variables by year.  We summarize 
the growth rate of this index by computing the Annual Average Growth Rate (AAGR), which is 
the mean of year-on-year percentage changes in the index values.
40
  In the top panel of Table VII 
we report estimates of AAGRs in a “base” hedonic model that excludes our two prominent 
quality measures, namely, LPATIENTS and SWE, which from Table VI we have observed as 
being highly statistically significant.  To quantify the importance of including these trial site 
quality characteristics in our hedonic regression equation, we compare AAGRs of predicted 
ln TGPP with and without the LPATIENTS and SWE variables included by examining the 
relative growth of coefficients on the yearly indicator variables.  The results are quite striking.  
With the pooled 1989-2011 regression, relative to the base model, TGPP grows much more 
slowly when the trial site characteristics are included—4.31%/6.96% for All (38% lower 
AAGR), 3.62%/7.01% for US Only (48% smaller AAGR), and 6.05%/8.70% for Rest of World 
(30% lower AAGR).  For the 1989-1999 regressions (second last column), the corresponding 
percent reductions in AAGRs are more modest—6% All, 31% US Only, and 19% for Rest of 
World, but for the most recent 2000-2011 time period regressions (last column), they are not 
only large proportionately—40% lower AAGR for All, 56% for US Only, and 28% for Rest of 
World, but the absolute differences in AAGRs are substantial as well—3.95% (9.93% - 5.98%) 
for All, 3.52% (12.36% - 8.84%) for Rest of the World, and  4.10% (7.38% - 3.28%)  for the US 
                                                     
40
 These arithmetic AAGRs were more stable than were estimates of compounded AGRs, since the latter were 
sensitive to choice of initial and end-year time periods. 
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Only. We conclude, therefore, that controlling for the clinical trial quality characteristics 
LPATIENTS and SWE results in much lower AAGRs, and helps explain in part why it is that 
TGPP has been increasing steadily over the last two decades.  
The bottom three panels of Table VII report AAGRs based on separate regressions by 
trial phase.  As seen in the first column of Table VII based on pooled 1989-2011 regressions, 
over all trial phases US Only AAGRs are smaller than the All regression AAGRs, with the Rest 
of World regression AAGRs being greater than those in All for Phases I, II, Phases IIIA, and 
IIIB, but less than All for Phase IV.  The variation in AAGRs within each set of regressions is 
quite large—from 3.78% to 11.91% in All, and 6.29% to 15.51% in the Rest of World, but only 
3.48% to 6.78% in US Only regressions.  AAGRs are generally lowest in Phase IIIA and IIIB, 
and mostly highest in Phase II and Phase IV.  Even though the regressions involve pooled 1989-
2011 data, as seen in the second and third column there is considerable variation across the two 
time intervals within the pooled regression, though less in US only than in the All and Rest of 
World regressions. 
Comparing 1989-1999 AAGRs from the pooled regression (column two) with those from 
the separate 1989-1999 regression (column four), and the 1999-2011 AAGRs from the pooled 
regression (column three) with those from the separate 2000-2011 regression (last column) 
provides some evidence regarding parameter stability.  The 1989-1999 relative rankings of 
AAGRs across trial phases in columns two and four is quite robust, but slightly less so when 
comparing relative rankings in columns three and five.  Particularly notable is the uniformly 
greatest growth rate during the 2000s in Phase IV trials, with substantial but less uniformly large 
AAGRs in Phase I studies.  
Of particular interest is a comparison of growth rates of price indexes derived from 
parameters of the base hedonic model including indicator variables for trial phase, therapeutic 
area, and year, the augmented hedonic model with SWE and LPATIENTS added to the base 
hedonic model as regressors, and the BRDPI published by the NIH under contract to BEA (the 
last based on only NIH funded research, and performed primarily but not exclusively at 
academic medical centers).  In Figure 3 we plot the annual time series of the three price indexes, 
based on US-only regression estimates for the two hedonic equations, with the normalized series 
for mean TGPP included for reference.  The results are striking.  Indexed to 1.000 in 1989, in 
2011 the BRDPI is 2.205, very close to the augmented hedonic price index value of 2.138; with 
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very similar AAGRs and compound annual growth rates (CAGRs) over the period: 3.66% 
AAGR and CAGR for the BRDPI and 3.63% AAGR and 3.31% CAGR for the augmented 
hedonic index.  By contrast, the 2011 price index derived from the base hedonic model (omitting 
the SWE and LPATIENTS quality variables) has a value of 4.178, and an AAGR of 7.01% and 
CAGR of 6.71%.  Thus the input cost based BRDPI and augmented hedonic model price indexes 
grow much more slowly—at about one half of the rate as those derived from the base hedonic 
model, which controls only for changes in the “mix” of the sample over trial phases and 
therapeutic classes.   
Tables VIII and IX present results of two sets of exploratory findings.  Although issues of 
sample size are likely to become important, we estimate ln TGPP equations at the level of the 
therapeutic class, pooled 1989-2011 and separately for 1989-1999 and 2000-2011; as before we 
do three geography-based estimations—All, US-Only and Rest of World.  There are 15 
therapeutic classes in our trial data, 14 of them involving biopharmaceuticals plus a devices and 
diagnostics category.  In Table VIII we report AAGRs by therapeutic class for the US-Only and 
Rest of World regressions; note that because of the absence of any observations in some years, 
there is some variability from the 1989-2011, 1989-99 and 2000-11 beginning and ending years, 
as is described at the bottom of the table.  The most striking feature of Table VIII is the 
substantial variability in the AAGRs; not shown is the even greater variability in the estimates on 
the year indicator variables within each therapeutic class.  While is it likely that there is in fact 
substantial variation across therapeutic classes in the rate of change of trial costs, at least some of 
the variation is likely attributable to the smaller sample sizes in certain years that result from 
disaggregating into 15 therapeutic classes.  This makes it difficult to estimate the hedonic index 
values precisely, and particularly outside the US there are only enough observations for some 
therapeutic classes to estimate the index values in a limited number of years.  
We conclude that constructing price indexes for clinical trials at the level of therapeutic 
classes (in our case, which number 15) is likely to be infeasible because of sample size issues, 
particularly for ex-US sites.   
Our final exploratory price index analysis involves aggregating up from individual 
multiple sites within a given trial to the trial level at which there is a common protocol.  This 
allows us to examine whether number of trial sites and the geographical scope of the sites affects 
our dependent variable, ln TGPP.  This aggregation reduces our sample size from the 207,950 
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sites in Table VI to 24,172 distinct trials.  We construct two new variables that vary at the level 
of the individual trial protocol:  number of sites, and number of sites per country.  We also 
recalculate the dependent variable, LPATIENTS and the SWE variable at the trial level of 
aggregation.  We do not have a prior expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient on total 
number of sites per trial.  This coefficient will capture whether or not there are cost impacts of 
allocating a given number of patients across different numbers of sites.  To the extent there are 
fixed costs incurred at each site for setting up patient recruitment, independent of the number of 
patients enrolled at a given site, then holding the numbers of trial patients constant, the aggregate 
TGPP would be expected to increase with the number of sites.  On the other hand, if fixed costs 
are largely trial specific rather than site-specific, and are carried in the “overhead” part of trial 
costs which we do not observe in these data, then they will either not affect site-level costs, i.e. 
no observable impact of number of sites on aggregate TGPP, or to the extent that they reduce 
site-specific costs otherwise borne by investigators, will result in a negative relationship between 
aggregate TGPP and number of sites.   
Some of these trial-level fixed costs are likely to be country-specific, reflecting factors 
such as national institutional review boards, import duties and tariffs, medical licensing 
conventions or other costs of conforming to a given country’s regulatory framework and medical 
infrastructure.  To the extent that these costs are “pushed down” to individual sites, rather than 
absorbed in the overall “overhead” cost of the trial then aggregate TGPP may be affected by the 
number of sites per country.  We therefore also control for each trial’s number of sites per 
country.    
In Table IX, we report coefficient estimates on the number of sites, and the number of 
sites per country, for regressions at two levels of aggregation:  Pooled over phases (but with 
phase indicator variables included as regressors), and separately by trial phase.
41
  When pooled 
over phases, the estimate on number of sites is positive and strongly significant, while the  
number of sites per country is negative  but not significant.  When estimated separately by phase, 
signs on the number of sites variable are mixed but monotonically decline moving from early to 
late phases, although none is statistically significant.   However, all but one of the estimates on 
the number of sites per country are positive, and statistically significant in the case of Phase II 
                                                     
41
 SWE, LPATIENTS, and year, therapeutic class and phase indicators are also included in the regressions.  
Estimated coefficients on SWE and LPATIENTS were similar in magnitude to those obtained in the site-level 
regressions, and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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and IIIA trials.  In almost all cases, however, the absolute magnitudes of the coefficient estimates 
are very small—an order of magnitude or smaller than those on the LPATIENTS and SWE 
variables reported in Table VI.  We conclude that at the level of a clinical trial protocol, the 
number of sites and number of sites per country do not appear to have a material effect on the 
total grant cost per patient. These trial characteristics might, however, have varying effects on 
the sponsors’ overall “headquarters” overhead costs, which we do not observe. 
V. Alternate Index Methodologies 
One important practical issue with hedonic indexes such as those estimated in the 
previous section is that of updating and revisions: over time as new data are acquired, statistical 
agencies undertaking re-estimation of the pooled regression model for the expanded and updated 
data set will likely find there are changes in the estimated time dummy coefficients and thus in 
the historical hedonic price index values derived from them.  Revising historical time series of 
price indexes each time a new time period is added is an unattractive feature of the pooled 
hedonic price index methodology.  One way to avoid this problem is to construct an index based 
on results from a set of sequentially estimated “adjacent year” regressions: for any year t, 
estimate the model on data only for years t and t-1, with the coefficient on a dummy variable for 
year t providing an estimate of the change in a quality-adjusted or characteristics-adjusted index 
over the two periods. Year-on-year changes can be then be chained to create an index for the 
whole time period. 
Focusing on the US-only sample, we find that indexes constructed using this method 
track the hedonic index estimated from the pooled sample quite closely.  For the “base” model 
that controls only for phase and therapeutic class, the AAGR of the adjacent-years index is 
7.47%, compared to the 7.01% for the pooled hedonic (and 7.52% for the mean nominal TGPP).  
For the hedonic models that include SWE and LPATIENTS, the AAGR for the adjacent-year 
index is 3.73%, compared to 3.62% for the pooled hedonic.  (Recall that the AAGR for the 
BRDPI is 3.66%.)  These results reflect remarkably similar growth rates based on alternative 
price index methodologies over almost a quarter century time period.  While a formal statistical 
test rejects equality of the coefficients on all the variables across all pairs of adjacent years, 
visual examination of the coefficients in each of the adjacent-year regressions (not presented 
here) shows them to be quite stable over time. 
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An even more general alternative approach to estimating the constant-characteristics 
change in price (sometimes known as the Pure Hedonic method, see Pakes (2003), and Berndt, 
Griliches and Rappaport (1995)) is to estimate regression coefficients separately for each year, 
and then compute Paasche-style or Laspeyres-style index ratios using alternative fixed quantity 
(characteristic) weights..  For example, if     are the characteristics for each observation in year 
0 and     are hedonic coefficients estimated from the year 0 regression, and     and     are the 
characteristics for each observation and hedonic coefficients estimated for year 1, then a 
Laspeyres-type measure of the change in constant-characteristics prices can be calculated as 
    
       
       
 and the corresponding Paasche-type index as     
       
       
 , with the Fischer Ideal 
index given by          .   
The advantage of this method over the adjacent-years dummy variable method is that in 
the adjacent year regressions the only parameters that is allowed to vary between the two 
adjacent years is the year dummy variable, whereas in the Pure Hedonic method all coefficient 
estimates (interpreted as shadow prices of the characteristics) can change between years.  In the 
Pure Hedonic method, these yearly shadow prices are weighted by fixed weights—either the 
base period (Laspeyres) or the current period (Paasche) characteristics.   
A potential problem with the chained L1 and P1 price indexes is “drift.”   If there is 
“bouncing” (upward changes followed by downward changes) of relative prices over a multi-
year period, then negative autocorrelations in prices combined with  negative correlations 
between price and quantity changes, can generate an upward “drift” in the chained L1 index and 
a downward “drift” in the P1 index.
42
  . Although the theoretical foundations have to the best of 
our knowledge not been derived, it is possible that a superlative chained Fisher Ideal index that is 
the geometric mean of a chained Laspeyres and chained Paasche index would embody offsetting 
drifts, thereby resulting in a more reliable chained index than either the Laspeyres or Paasche. 
Results from calculating these indexes and chaining for all years in the US-only sample 
are broadly consistent with the results from the adjacent-years method.  For the regression 
specification that includes SWE and LPATIENTS, the AAGR for a Laspeyres-type pure hedonic 
index was 5.40%, 2.44% for a Paasche-type pure hedonic index, and 3.89% for the Fischer-Ideal 
                                                     
42
 For a discussion of drift in the context of alternative direct and chained index numbers, see Bohdan J. Szulc, 
“Linking Price Index Numbers”, in W. Erwin Diewert and Claude Montmarquette, eds., Price Level Measurement: 
Proceedings from a conference sponsored by Statistics Canada, Ottawa, Canada: Ministry of Supply and Services 
Canada, December 1983, pp. 537-566. 
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pure hedonic index.  We plot the various hedonic indexes (based on the augmented regression) in 
Figure 4.  There it is seen that the pooled hedonic, adjacent-years hedonic and pure hedonic 
Fisher Ideal indexes track each other (and the BRDPI) quite closely.  Values of these four 
indexes are remarkably close to each other in 2011: 2.046 for the pooled hedonic, 2.138 for the 
adjacent-years hedonic, and 2.221 for the pure hedonic Fisher-Ideal, compared to 2.205 for the 
BRDPI.  These four indexes have very similar AAGRs (3.62%, 3.73%, 3.89%, and 3.66%, 
respectively) and CAGRs (3.31%, 3.52%,3.69%, and 3.66%, respectively.  In contrast, the 
chained pure hedonic Paasche (with potential downward drift) and the chained pure hedonic 
Laspeyres (with possible upward drift) have 2011 index values well below and above the other 
four.  The Paaache index value for 2011 was only 1.627 (AAGR of 2.4% and CAGR of 2.24%) 
while the Laspeyres was 3.033 (AAGR of 5.40% and CAGR of 5.17%).  
The close correspondence between the results for all three of hedonic index methods 
(pooled time dummy, adjacent-years time dummy, and “pure hedonic”) suggest to us that the 
underlying relationship between the observed nominal transaction prices and the key 
characteristics of each contract (SWE, LPATIENTS, phase and therapeutic class) is quite robust, 
at least within the US-only sample.  It would therefore appear to be reasonable to develop a 
periodically updated index using either the pure hedonic Fisher Ideal or adjacent-year time 
dummy methods with US data, 
VI. Summary, Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
Expenditures on clinical trials undertaken to develop new drugs have increased 
dramatically over the past 30 years.  To better understand the underlying causes it is critical to be 
able to decompose increases in total spending into the “price effect”, the “quantity effect,” and 
the “quality” effect.   Are biopharmaceutical companies doing more clinical research, has the 
cost of doing a given amount of research increased, or are both occurring?  In this study we focus 
on the “unit costs” of certain aspects of conducting clinical trials.  These have risen substantially 
in recent decades, outpacing general inflation and other measures of changes in costs of other 
inputs to biomedical R&D.  Our results suggest that these increases in trial costs are not solely 
attributable to changes in input costs such as wages, equipment, and facilities.  They also appear 
to have been driven to a substantial extent by two other phenomena: smaller numbers of patients 
per site, and increases in the “effort” level required by investigators as study protocols have 
required more costly and complex monitoring and testing of subjects.  Evaluated at the sample 
 21 
means, our estimated elasticity of TGPP with respect to SWE is about 0.5.  Over the 1989-2011 
time period, mean values of SWE have varied by as much as a factor more than three, generally 
rising but not quite monotonically over time (Table I).  This suggests that increased trial intensity 
and trial design complexity—as measured by SWE—have been major drivers of the increase in 
nominal TGPP, over and above changes in input costs.  By comparison, our estimates of the 
elasticity of TGPP with respect to patients per site is much smaller in absolute magnitude (about 
-0.120 for the US, see Table VI), and since the relative decrease in patients over time is smaller 
than the relative increase in SWE, declining site “size” is not as large a driver of TGPP increases 
as are changes in SWE.  While the trends in SWE and patients per site are in turn likely driven to 
some extent by cost differences across therapeutic classes and phases of clinical development, 
the effects we find are estimated controlling for such study characteristics, and are not just an 
artifact of changes in the composition of the sample.  The size of the effects that we find implies 
that any effort to track costs of clinical research should pay close attention to the nature of study 
protocols and the organization and management of trials.  The extent to which increases in SWE 
are attributable to increased regulatory requirements and scrutiny versus evolving commercial 
product differentiation strategies is unknown and merits further analysis.  Our findings point to 
the value of using the hedonic regression methodology in this context. 
The price indexes for commercial clinical research constructed here appear to behave 
remarkably similar to those computed by BEA on behalf of NIH for input costs for public sector 
biomedical R&D, once one controls for SWE and LPATIENTS in the commercial trials; this 
unexpected congruence merits more careful attention and confirmation by government statistical 
agencies and other entities with an interest in tracking R&D costs in this sector.  Specifically, the 
AAGR of a price index that controls only for therapeutic class and phase of development grows 
almost twice as fast as the NIH BRDPI input costs index.  Interestingly, once the scale of 
investigator/site activity and the effort required by a study protocol are also controlled for, the 
estimated “quality-adjusted” rate of inflation within the US is remarkably similar to the BRDPI.  
This suggests that increases in commercial clinical trial costs are driven primarily by changes in 
the nature of clinical research rather than by inflation in input costs.   
Commercial databases such as the one we have used here appear to have great potential 
as a source of data for such price index measurement purposes, particularly if restricted to the US 
context.  Using these data it would appear to be feasible to reliably compute measures of price 
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inflation for this aspect of clinical research, to do this separately for different phases of clinical 
development, and for some but not all therapeutic classes.  The geographic reach of these data 
sources also presents interesting opportunities to benchmark R&D costs across different regions 
within the US, as well as across countries.  However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the 
number of observations is adequate in each of the annual therapeutic class data cells. 
There are some important limitations to this study.  In particular, we look only at one 
component of trial costs: payments to clinical investigators.  In this dataset, these account for 
about one half of the total cost of a trial.  It may well be that some of the higher per-patient costs 
created by having fewer patients per site and increased effort required by the protocol are offset 
by savings in the sponsors’ headquarters’ costs of centralized administration and coordination of 
trials that we do not observe here.  Limited availability of data prevents us from drawing strong 
conclusions about trends in total trial costs and underlying factors in recent years.  As noted 
above, the prices we observe are only for the payments made by the trial sponsor to investigators, 
either directly or through a CRO, and additional costs for trial design and administration are not 
included.  To the extent these additional “overhead” costs are understood as internal headquarters 
costs of the entity purchasing the R&D output of trial sites, then our focus on investigator 
contracts has the appropriate scope for purposes of developing a PPI for contracted R&D 
services.  On the other hand, if costs of trial design and administration are understood as R&D 
costs, then our focus may be too narrow.  In many instances, and increasingly over time, trial 
sponsors contract with a CRO to perform some or all of these functions, and such payments may 
well be considered part of the contracted R&D services. This is an issue that warrants further 
investigation, but would require additional data on the nature of payments by trial sponsors to 
CROs, and development of a linkage between these contracts and the investigator payments 
analyzed here.  In this context it is unclear how well the measure of “site work effort” used here 
captures differences in the burden imposed by, for example, running more complex trial 
protocols, where some of the “overhead” associated with management and administration is 
being borne by the site as opposed to the sponsor or CRO, as distinct from increased use of more 
costly interventions or methods of measuring trial endpoints.   
A second limitation of this study is that we cannot evaluate how representative is the 
universe of clinical trial contracts in the Medidata sample—over time, across therapeutic classes, 
and geographically.  Lastly, since the identity of study sponsors and investigators was not 
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available to us, we were not able to investigate differences in costs across (for example) trials 
sponsored by large versus small commercial entities, or where public sector or non-profit 
organizations are involved as sponsors or investigators rather than industry. 
 We look forward to addressing these questions in future research. 
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Table I: Total Grant Cost per Patient (TGPP) 
year mean p50 sd N 
     
1989 3772.59 2779.43 2921.34 1370 
1990 4385.77 3147.77 4016.57 3443 
1991 3774.43 2774.83 4186.06 9288 
1992 3493.63 2399.00 6129.31 14126 
1993 3664.58 2325.45 4254.28 15733 
1994 3911.39 2882.35 3925.46 16625 
1995 4183.00 3203.85 3941.90 15670 
1996 4884.89 3748.77 4708.14 14442 
1997 4549.12 3200.00 4422.39 13321 
1998 5393.70 3948.38 5445.89 14370 
1999 5501.08 4361.94 4874.07 13943 
2000 6220.42 4682.79 6243.02 18671 
2001 6078.96 4777.00 5150.11 16864 
2002 6567.58 4744.10 5984.32 12201 
2003 8147.90 6765.00 6866.55 6515 
2004 10264.00 8582.72 7758.22 3216 
2005 11412.77 9682.02 7828.89 2693 
2006 12364.68 10900.00 7460.17 4012 
2007 13001.19 10738.47 8863.90 4764 
2008 14834.64 12720.94 10328.42 3216 
2009 16518.28 13965.42 12550.80 4591 
2010 15099.19 12581.93 10860.27 4814 
2011 16566.55 13222.14 13556.92 2188 
    
 Total 6191.80 4195.07 6860.91 216076 
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Table II: SWE and Patients per Sitge  
 
(a) Site Work Effort (SWE) 
(Protocol level)  
(b) Patients 
(Site level) 
YEAR MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. N 
 
MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. N 
          
1989 17.07 13.29 12.88 240 
 
25.48 20.00 33.2476 1370 
1990 16.94 13.44 13.38 512 
 
21.26 15.00 27.3178 3443 
1991 14.85 11.16 12.11 1280 
 
20.64 15.00 32.4249 9288 
1992 17.74 13.46 15.45 1833 
 
18.50 12.00 25.253 14126 
1993 18.92 13.66 17.79 2024 
 
17.04 12.00 24.5758 15733 
1994 21.58 16.22 18.20 1967 
 
16.37 12.00 24.6318 16625 
1995 23.41 18.11 21.20 1826 
 
14.39 10.00 26.52 15675 
1996 23.69 18.64 19.32 1791 
 
14.83 10.00 36.2925 14444 
1997 24.93 19.26 20.11 1540 
 
14.14 10.00 17.6792 13321 
1998 25.77 19.64 19.81 1495 
 
14.60 10.00 24.9971 14370 
1999 26.87 20.55 23.89 1369 
 
13.85 10.00 17.0209 13944 
2000 28.18 22.44 22.47 1890 
 
11.27 9.00 14.7171 18696 
2001 29.91 22.78 24.18 1920 
 
12.11 10.00 13.8476 16907 
2002 28.91 21.97 24.06 1389 
 
12.07 10.00 12.2206 12250 
2003 35.46 29.29 27.26 933 
 
13.30 10.00 18.5263 6629 
2004 43.57 34.33 34.09 569 
 
12.18 9.00 14.5193 3362 
2005 47.65 39.06 38.04 307 
 
10.73 10.00 14.041 2784 
2006 45.53 35.62 35.96 274 
 
11.80 10.00 9.62717 4027 
2007 37.71 30.58 22.10 227 
 
10.30 9.00 8.47037 4784 
2008 48.64 41.55 37.49 183 
 
11.10 7.00 19.9492 3291 
2009 48.98 41.76 33.86 263 
 
11.81 8.00 15.4748 4729 
2010 46.16 38.52 33.39 275 
 
11.79 8.00 23.6707 4907 
2011 45.69 41.31 30.59 129 
 
11.83 8.00 17.0184 2224 
          
Total 25.94 19.21 23.28 24236 
 
14.42 10.00 22.58 216929 
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Table III: Development Phase Percentages 
Year Phase I Phase II Phase IIIA Phase IIIB Phase IV 
      
1989 2.12% 9.12% 72.55% 6.35% 9.85% 
1990 3.08% 13.94% 69.53% 5.84% 7.61% 
1991 3.45% 15.13% 50.67% 12.75% 18.01% 
1992 3.58% 14.14% 58.47% 6.98% 16.82% 
1993 3.96% 18.34% 56.79% 4.74% 16.16% 
1994 3.70% 18.80% 58.69% 7.65% 11.16% 
1995 4.20% 20.52% 54.23% 6.63% 14.41% 
1996 4.84% 23.09% 52.94% 8.55% 10.58% 
1997 4.14% 18.08% 56.53% 8.85% 12.40% 
1998 3.63% 19.08% 49.45% 13.84% 13.99% 
1999 4.06% 20.35% 49.25% 14.08% 12.26% 
2000 3.39% 17.59% 49.86% 17.72% 11.44% 
2001 3.64% 16.60% 50.21% 14.95% 14.60% 
2002 3.00% 20.99% 46.78% 16.56% 12.68% 
2003 4.06% 17.79% 45.26% 16.52% 16.38% 
2004 4.49% 23.38% 42.15% 18.59% 11.39% 
2005 2.33% 26.08% 51.33% 9.05% 11.21% 
2006 3.25% 15.50% 69.23% 3.35% 8.67% 
2007 2.17% 25.90% 49.85% 15.49% 6.58% 
2008 2.98% 23.06% 48.40% 16.38% 9.18% 
2009 3.45% 23.41% 58.64% 7.76% 6.75% 
2010 2.45% 31.97% 46.06% 11.98% 7.54% 
2011 1.66% 25.99% 55.35% 6.74% 10.25% 
      
Total 3.67% 19.26% 53.07% 11.18% 12.83% 
 
 
Table entries are the fraction of investigator contracts in that year for studies at each phase of 
clinical development.  Based on 216,929 total observations. 
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Year 
Anti-
Infective 
Cardio-
vascular 
Central 
Nervous 
System 
Dermatology 
Devices and 
Diagnostics 
Endocrine 
Gastro-
intestinal 
        
1989 7.66% 14.82% 14.38% 4.09% 0.00% 3.28% 10.07% 
1990 9.09% 21.64% 9.70% 2.27% 0.20% 7.29% 9.00% 
1991 8.81% 18.62% 14.69% 2.45% 0.12% 6.01% 13.18% 
1992 8.10% 16.69% 15.33% 2.63% 0.27% 5.88% 9.80% 
1993 10.13% 19.70% 14.37% 2.58% 0.35% 7.29% 9.92% 
1994 11.56% 20.82% 16.72% 2.15% 0.48% 6.42% 6.35% 
1995 8.09% 18.65% 16.66% 2.07% 0.05% 6.46% 4.43% 
1996 8.42% 16.45% 17.50% 1.88% 0.18% 7.57% 3.82% 
1997 6.58% 15.54% 19.06% 1.73% 0.29% 9.10% 4.51% 
1998 7.24% 15.85% 15.49% 2.75% 0.15% 11.69% 1.88% 
1999 5.49% 18.89% 14.08% 2.36% 0.32% 11.93% 2.76% 
2000 6.93% 15.28% 14.85% 2.40% 0.52% 13.61% 3.36% 
2001 10.56% 9.39% 13.95% 2.83% 0.15% 14.83% 5.20% 
2002 6.39% 8.42% 13.84% 2.02% 0.17% 17.37% 3.85% 
2003 8.63% 9.94% 22.85% 6.14% 0.86% 12.25% 2.16% 
2004 5.68% 12.31% 27.96% 1.81% 1.04% 13.06% 0.39% 
2005 4.92% 21.62% 21.12% 3.84% 1.11% 5.28% 2.12% 
2006 2.36% 12.14% 27.04% 2.48% 0.15% 19.44% 3.30% 
2007 4.77% 4.52% 17.52% 1.17% 0.31% 18.42% 7.46% 
2008 3.77% 6.05% 17.23% 3.80% 0.64% 21.27% 5.62% 
2009 9.45% 1.69% 18.95% 1.78% 2.24% 23.77% 4.95% 
2010 6.64% 1.26% 12.43% 5.05% 2.71% 31.57% 4.18% 
2011 1.35% 0.63% 14.88% 6.07% 6.03% 28.46% 0.05% 
        
Total 7.87% 14.79% 16.21% 2.56% 0.47% 11.44% 5.29% 
 
 
Table entries are the fraction of investigator contracts in that year for studies in each therapeutic 
area.  Based on 216,929 total observations 
  
Table IV: Distribution of Sample by Therapeutic Class 
 28 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Genitourinary 
System 
Hematology 
Immuno-
modulation 
Oncology 
Ophthal-
mology 
Pain and 
Anesthesia 
Pharmaco-
kinetics 
Respiratory 
System 
         
1989 10.51% 0.58% 18.76% 5.84% 1.68% 1.61% 1.68% 5.04% 
1990 5.14% 1.95% 7.75% 8.51% 8.19% 0.46% 1.54% 7.26% 
1991 5.33% 0.39% 8.57% 4.94% 2.57% 1.07% 2.02% 11.24% 
1992 8.58% 0.42% 6.26% 5.12% 0.68% 3.27% 2.10% 14.87% 
1993 9.76% 0.70% 6.06% 3.37% 0.66% 0.90% 2.07% 12.15% 
1994 5.73% 0.94% 6.09% 4.84% 1.41% 0.87% 2.36% 13.27% 
1995 7.45% 0.54% 5.33% 8.22% 1.07% 1.33% 2.29% 17.34% 
1996 4.94% 1.70% 7.55% 9.62% 0.80% 2.85% 2.51% 14.21% 
1997 6.51% 0.62% 5.33% 10.81% 1.70% 1.37% 2.67% 14.17% 
1998 8.20% 1.75% 5.82% 10.51% 1.34% 1.51% 2.39% 13.43% 
1999 6.66% 3.13% 10.23% 10.44% 1.78% 2.20% 2.57% 7.16% 
2000 5.60% 3.29% 7.05% 11.26% 0.59% 2.12% 1.87% 11.27% 
2001 7.58% 1.41% 9.30% 10.46% 1.20% 2.98% 1.87% 8.28% 
2002 9.82% 1.89% 9.63% 10.21% 1.52% 4.58% 1.56% 8.73% 
2003 4.89% 2.07% 6.46% 10.47% 1.28% 4.16% 1.89% 5.96% 
2004 8.36% 3.84% 9.52% 10.14% 0.54% 0.27% 2.23% 2.86% 
2005 2.26% 6.07% 7.79% 18.25% 0.36% 1.51% 1.01% 2.73% 
2006 3.43% 0.30% 8.12% 11.12% 1.04% 6.48% 0.60% 1.99% 
2007 11.64% 0.65% 9.49% 8.38% 0.92% 7.34% 0.10% 7.32% 
2008 5.89% 0.58% 15.16% 14.80% 2.25% 2.22% 0.21% 0.52% 
2009 7.74% 1.61% 7.70% 14.55% 1.46% 1.97% 0.68% 1.48% 
2010 5.34% 1.87% 5.24% 11.98% 2.65% 6.07% 0.79% 2.20% 
2011 3.06% 10.12% 5.35% 12.55% 6.07% 1.17% 2.52% 1.71% 
         
Total 6.99% 1.62% 7.43% 9.00% 1.40% 2.35% 1.98% 10.59% 
 
  
Table IV (cont.): Distribution of Sample by Therapeutic Class 
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Table V: Geographic Distribution of Sites 
 
(a) US vs. Ex-US (b)       Ex-US 
Year US RoW OECD Other 
 
 
  
  
1989 81.82% 18.18% 100.00% 0.00% 
1990 77.17% 22.83% 99.11% 0.89% 
1991 67.51% 32.49% 99.83% 0.17% 
1992 49.19% 50.81% 99.79% 0.21% 
1993 47.31% 52.69% 99.59% 0.41% 
1994 46.57% 53.43% 99.64% 0.36% 
1995 47.50% 52.50% 99.54% 0.46% 
1996 55.23% 44.77% 99.72% 0.28% 
1997 48.18% 51.82% 98.87% 1.13% 
1998 46.09% 53.91% 98.06% 1.94% 
1999 53.49% 46.51% 96.62% 3.38% 
2000 56.33% 43.67% 92.05% 7.95% 
2001 56.54% 43.46% 89.06% 10.94% 
2002 54.08% 45.92% 90.19% 9.81% 
2003 52.69% 47.31% 90.66% 9.34% 
2004 54.46% 45.54% 84.91% 15.09% 
2005 62.75% 37.25% 83.32% 16.68% 
2006 85.10% 14.90% 83.50% 16.50% 
2007 87.54% 12.46% 58.89% 41.11% 
2008 68.82% 31.18% 55.36% 44.64% 
2009 77.65% 22.35% 62.25% 37.75% 
2010 76.56% 23.44% 68.87% 31.13% 
2011 68.03% 31.97% 53.59% 46.41% 
  
  
  
Total 55.65% 44.35% 94.61% 5.39% 
 
 
Table entries are the fraction of investigator contracts in that year located in each geographic 
area.  Panel (a) shows the breakdown between US and all other countries.  Panel B breaks out the 
Ex-US countries into OECD member countries (Canada, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, France, Norway, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom) versus all others.  
Based on 216,929 total observations. 
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TABLE VI:  PARAMETER ESTIMATES ON LOG PATIENTS AND SITE WORK EFFORT 
TRIAL CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLES 
 
 
Pooled 1989-2011 1989-1999  2000-2011  
 
LPATIENTS SWE LPATIENTS SWE LPATIENTS SWE 
Phases Pooled 
             All             0.148 0.0205 0.183 0.0279 0.0419 0.0152 
       US Only  -0.122 0.0171 -0.120 0.0219 -0.117 0.0143 
       Rest of World 0.124 0.0225 0.128 0.0296 0.0541 0.0161 
       By Phase 
            All 
               Phase I   -0.145 0.0130 -0.168 0.0164 -0.0966 0.00972 
         Phase II  -0.0173 0.0182 -0.011† 0.0222 -0.0321 0.0149 
         Phase IIIA    0.120 0.0198 0.173 0.0285 -0.0240 0.0137 
         Phase IIIB     0.155 0.0284 0.226 0.0341 0.0299 0.0244 
         Phase IV 0.320 0.0344 0.305 0.0489 0.272 0.0253 
       By Phase 
            US Only 
               Phase I   -0.176 0.0143 -0.219 0.0194 -0.104 0.0102 
         Phase II  -0.164 0.0159 -0.197 0.0173 -0.125 0.0144 
         Phase IIIA    -0.102 0.0164 -0.0986 0.0239 -0.0940 0.0127 
         Phase IIIB     -0.0631 0.0257 -0.0541 0.0238 -0.0513 0.0263 
         Phase IV -0.170 0.0247 -0.153 0.0273 -0.190 0.0217 
       By Phase 
            Rest of World 
               Phase I   -0.120 0.0109 -0.131 0.0134 -0.0799 0.00788 
         Phase II  -0.01 0.0186 -0.0313 0.0265 -0.0080† 0.0143 
         Phase IIIA    0.0826 0.0220 0.121 0.0277 -0.0588 0.0157 
         Phase IIIB     0.101 0.0276 0.115 0.0372 0.0409 0.0213 
         Phase IV 0.217 0.0482 0.171 0.0619 0.225 0.0322 
 
 
Notes:  Table entries are the estimated coefficients on LPATIENTS and SWE in a regression of 
log(TGPP) on these and other explanatory variables.  With the exception of the coefficients marked †, all 
coefficients in the table were statistically distinguishable from zero at the p<0.01 level using robust 
standard errors, clustered by trial protocol. The phases pooled regression includes a constant, indicator 
variables for therapeutic class, trial phase, and years.  The by phase regressions include a constant and 
indicator variables for therapeutic class and year.  Number of observations was 207,950  in the top panel 
All regressions, 118,477  in the US Only regressions, and 89,473  in the Rest of World regressions. 
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TABLE VII:  AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF CLINICAL TRIAL COSTS – 
ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND TIME PERIODS 
 
 
1989-2011 Regression AAGR 1989-1999  2000-2011  
 
1989-
2011 
1989-
1999 
  1999-
2011  
Regression  
AAGR 
Regression 
AAGR 
Base Model^ 
            All                6.96%    3.98%    9.45%    3.79%    9.93% 
       US Only  7.01 5.80 8.01 5.70 7.38 
       Rest of World 8.70 6.66 10.39 6.54 12.36 
      Add SWE and 
     LPATIENTS^ 
         All 4.31 3.96 4.59 3.54 5.98 
    US Only 3.62 4.28 3.07 3.92 3.28 
    Rest of World  6.05 6.02 6.08 5.29 8.84 
      With SWE and 
     LPATIENTS by 
phase^^ 
           All 
              Phase I      7.48%    5.67%    8.98%    5.19%    9.08% 
         Phase II  6.01 6.58 5.54 6.91 5.98 
         Phase IIIA    4.04 3.88 4.18 3.25 5.16 
         Phase IIIB     3.78 2.32 5.00 1.79 5.65 
         Phase IV 11.91 9.25 14.13 8.17 15.75 
      US Only 
              Phase I   6.78 5.72 7.66 5.07 8.58 
         Phase II  6.00 7.77 4.52 7.61 4.32 
         Phase IIIA    3.78 4.33 3.32 3.68 2.93 
         Phase IIIB     3.48 3.92 3.11 4.24 3.34 
         Phase IV 6.43 8.02 5.11 7.80 4.03 
      Rest of World 
              Phase I   15.51 11.69 18.70 10.62 23.96 
         Phase II  7.64 8.48 6.95 8.65 9.52 
         Phase IIIA    6.29 6.87 5.81 6.30 7.87 
         Phase IIIB     12.29 15.54 9.59 13.72 11.55 
         Phase IV 9.36 10.73 8.22 8.87 11.74 
 
 
Notes:  Table entries are the annual average growth rate (AAGR) of an hedonic price index constructed 
from the estimated coefficients on indicator variables for year.  See text.   ^Regressions also include 
constant and indicator variables for therapeutic class, and trial phase.   ^^Regressions also include 
constant and indicator variables for therapeutic class. 
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TABLE VIII:  AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF CLINICAL TRIAL COSTS  
BY THERAPEUTIC AREA AND TIME PERIOD 
 
 
1989-2011 Regression 1989-99 Regression 2000-2011 Regression 
Therapeutic Class 1989-2011 AAGR 1989-99 AAGR 2000-2011 AAGR 
    
 
US Only Regressions 
    Anti-infective    4.73%    0.81%    7.65% 
Cardiovascular 18.64 4.95 14.10 
Central Nervous System 5.05 5.00 5.35 
Dermatology 6.56 9.18 2.10 
Devices & Diagnostics  17.62a   18.32b 22.08 
Endocrine 4.94 5.60 4.20 
Gastrointestinal 7.11 5.77 3.14 
Genitourinary System 9.02 9.96 8.87 
Hematology 11.17 25.24 2.71 
Immunomodulation 6.08 6.77 5.82 
Oncology 6.70 3.81 6.51 
Ophthalmology 9.67 8.96 21.97 
Pain & Anaesthesia 10.07 9.59 11.25 
Pharmacokinetics 6.84 5.27 8.98 
Respiratory System 8.56 5.84 12.13 
    
 
1989-2011 Regression 1989-99 Regression 2000-2011 Regression 
Therapeutic Class 1989-2011 AAGR 1989-99 AAGR 2000-2011 AAGR 
    
 
Rest of World Regressions 
    Anti-infective    10.19%    12.66%    14.13% 
Cardiovascular 15.88 13.24 13.95 
Central Nervous System 9.68 6.18 13.32 
Dermatology  15.99c 15.06 -1.41 
Devices & Diagnostics  17.50
d  -9.97 g  30.61h 
Endocrine 6.10 7.66 5.83 
Gastrointestinal 20.14 3.27 23.55 
Genitourinary System 6.58 4.75 9.01 
Hematology  11.40e 19.24  2.38i 
Immunomodulation 13.17 18.07 12.01 
Oncology 9.60 6.39 14.40 
Ophthalmology 29.60 42.85 17.69 
Pain & Anaesthesia  43.98f 47.61 45.37 
Pharmacokinetics  7.99f 1.65   12.93k 
Respiratory System 11.52 10.25   20.09k 
   
 
Notes:  
a
1999-2011; 
b
1990-94; 
c
1990-2003; 
d
1992-98; 
e
1989-2005; 
f
1989-2006;
g
1993-99; 
h
2009-11; 
 
i
2000-5;
 k 
2000-06  
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TABLE IX:  PARAMETER ESTIMATES IN MODEL ESTIMATED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 
WITH ADDITIONAL TRIAL-SPECIFIC EXPLANATORY VARIABLES,  
POOLED 1989-2011 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln TGPP 
 
  
No. Sites No. Sites/Country 
 
Sample Size 
      Pooled Over Phases 
 
0.00164*** -0.000979 
 
24,172 
      By Phase 
              Phase I   
 
0.0223 0.0102 
 
5,557 
         Phase II  
 
0.00116 0.00506*** 
 
5,775 
         Phase IIIA    
 
0.000371 0.00161* 
 
8,953 
         Phase IIIB     
 
-0.000837 0.000454 
 
1,735 
         Phase IV 
 
-0.00206 -0.00126 
 
2,152 
 
 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-values of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.  The 
phases pooled regression includes a constant, LPATIENTS, SWE, and indicator variables for therapeutic 
class, trial phase and years.  The by phase regressions include a constant, LPATIENTS, SWE, and 
indicator variables for therapeutic class and year. Regressions are pooled into All, 1989-2011.     
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Figure 3: Nominal TGPP, BRDPI, and Hedonic Indexes
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